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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ATTORNEY GENERAL,  




On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Numbers: A208-455-092 & A208-455-093) 
Immigration Judge: John B. Carle 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 16, 2019 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 








                                                          
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Dora Alvarenga de Rodriguez and her minor daughter, aliens from El Salvador, 
petition for review of a final administrative order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) affirming both their removability and the rejection of their application for asylum.  
We will deny the petition. 
 Discussion1 
On appeal, Alvarenga de Rodriguez challenges her removability under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and the denial of her asylum application.2  We review legal and 
constitutional issues de novo, see Duhaney v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 
345 (3d Cir. 2010), and we will uphold the BIA’s factual findings if they are supported 
by “substantial evidence,” Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 527 F.3d 330, 
340 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  Where, as here, 
“the BIA has affirmed the IJ’s decision, and adopted the analysis as its own, we will 
review both decisions.” Quao Lin Dong v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 638 F.3d 223, 227 
(3d Cir. 2011).    
A. Removability 
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “any immigrant at the time of 
application for admission . . . who is not in possession of a . . . valid entry document . . . 
                                                          
1 This Court has jurisdiction over Alvarenga de Rodriguez’s petition for review 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).   
 
2 Alvarenga de Rodriguez does not challenge the BIA’s denial of her applications 




is inadmissible.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i).  Alvarenga argues that she never made an 
“application for admission” because she entered without inspection.  Pet. 8–9.  This 
argument is belied by the plain text of the statute: “An alien present in the United States 
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a 
designated port of arrival . . . ) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant 
for admission.”  8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).  When Alvarenga arrived in the United States 
without being admitted, she was an “applicant for admission.”  Id.  Accordingly, because 
she was not in possession of a valid entry document at the time of her arrival, she is 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).3  
B. Asylum  
To establish that she is a refugee and thus eligible for asylum, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1), a petitioner must prove four elements: “(1) a particular social group that is 
legally cognizable; 4 (2) membership in that group; (3) a well-founded fear of 
persecution, which must be subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable; and (4) a 
                                                          
3 Alvarenga de Rodriguez argues that Congress intended 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) to be the exclusive basis for removal for “alien[s] present in the United 
States without being admitted or paroled.”  Pet. 11.  However, 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—unlike 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)—is not listed as a basis for 
expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).  Therefore, the two statutory bases 
for removal serve different purposes.   
 
4 A particular social group is a group that is “(1) composed of members who share 
a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially 
distinct within the society in question.”  S.E.R.L. v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 894 F.3d 




nexus, or causal link, between the persecution and membership in the particular social 
group.” S.E.R.L. v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 2018).  
In removal proceedings, Alvarenga de Rodriguez argued that she and her daughter 
were entitled to asylum because she would face persecution on a protected ground: Her 
membership in a particular social group of “women in El Salvador who have close family 
members in the United States.”  Pet. 13.  The IJ found that even assuming Alvarenga de 
Rodriguez established a cognizable particular social group, she “did not establish a nexus 
between the harm she fears and her membership in the group,” A.R. 59–60, and the BIA 
affirmed.  We conclude that this determination was supported by substantial evidence.   
 We also perceive no error in the BIA’s determination that Alvarenga de Rodriguez 
lacked a well-founded fear of persecution, or that any such persecution would not have 
been related to her proposed social group.  We have observed that “ordinary criminal 
activity does not rise to the level of persecution necessary to establish eligibility for 
asylum.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, there is no record 
evidence that the gang’s extortion of Alvarenga de Rodriguez was more than a “mere 
act[] of random lawlessness,” id. at 495.  For example, Alvarenga de Rodriguez was not 
extorted during the first four years her husband lived in the United States.  Additionally, 
there is no evidence that when she was extorted by gang members, the gang members 
knew her husband lived in the United States and sent her money, or that she was targeted 
because of those circumstances.  Although Alvarenga de Rodriguez asks us to accept that 
the gang members must have known her husband lived in the United States because they 




inference: The fact that the gang members asked her for $500 suggests they knew she had 
access to money, but not necessarily that this money came from family in the United 
States.  Thus, the BIA and the IJ reasonably concluded that the gang members were 
motivated by a “desire to increase their own wealth” and not by Alvarenga de 
Rodriguez’s “husband’s residence in the United States.”  A.R. 6. 
The other incident to which Alvarenga de Rodriguez points as past persecution—a 
strange man hiding in her shower and attempting to attack her—also lacks sufficient 
nexus to Alvarenga de Rodriguez’s status as a woman in El Salvador with family in the 
United States.  Alvarenga de Rodriguez never learned the identity of this man, and there 
is no evidence in the record that this man was part of the gang that extorted her or that he 
tried to attack her because her husband lived in the United States.  In short, substantial 
evidence supported the BIA’s finding that there was no nexus between any past 
persecution suffered by Alvarenga de Rodriguez and her membership in her proposed 
particular social group.  See Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 340; see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will deny Alvarenga de Rodriguez’s and her 
daughter’s petition for review. 
